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INTRODUCTION
Physician deselection has been described as a "very complex issue
that lacks a complex history."' Essentially, a standard contract term
that gave no physician pause in the "good old days" now causes
significant heartburn for doctors living in the world of managed
care. The term "physician deselection" generally refers to the
process by which a managed care organization (MCO) terminates its
relationship with an affiliated physician in its network, whether
with cause or without cause.2 The problem of physician deselection
is a product of the transition of the U.S. health care delivery system
from a fee-for-service insurance model to a managed care model.
In the era of fee-for-service health insurance, insurers would pay
for the medical bills of their insured essentially without regard to
who was the treating physician.3 During the MCO revolution of the
1980s and 1990s, physicians' role with respect to insurers suddenly
changed from something akin to independent contractors to
something much closer to being true employees. Physicians now
need to worry not only about treating patients, but also about
providing their services in a "managed care compatible" fashion.4 In
1996, when the Supreme Court of New Hampshire issued its
decision in Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc.,5 a state
court of final jurisdiction for the first time held that deselections
without cause and without the opportunity for review violate public
policy.6
1. Lowell C. Brown & Elizabeth Jagla, Credentialing, Peer Review, and Provider
Deselection in Managed Care: Providers in the Crossfire, 20 WHIT1IER L. REV 375, 375 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Allen D. Allred & Don L. Daniel, Upon Further Review: Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran and a New Era of Managed Care Organization Liability, 47 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 309, 350-51 (2003); Bryan A. Liang, Deselection Under Harper v. Healthsource: A Blow
for Maintaining Patient-Physician Relationships in the Era of Managed Care?, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 799, 801 (1997).
3. See Brown & Jagla, supra note 1, at 375-76; Richard S. Liner, Note, Physician
Deselection: The Dynamics of a New Threat to the Physician-Patient Relationship, 23 AM. J.L.
& MED. 511, 516-17 (1997).
4. See Liner, supra note 3, at 514-16; see also N.J. Psychological Ass'n v. MCC Behavioral
Care, Inc., No. 96-CV-3080, 1997 WL 33446538, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 1997) (noting an
MCO's use of the phrase "managed care compatible").
5. 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996).
6. Id. at 964-67.
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Though case law on physician deselection appears to have
stagnated since the 2000 California Supreme Court decision in
Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,' legislators and courts
need to continue working to prevent deselection abuses. This Note
will examine recent judicial and legislative attempts to provide
procedural protections to physicians facing deselection. This Note
will also analyze the current state of health insurance markets to
assess whether they have stabilized to the point where improper
deselections will no longer be a significant problem. Evidence of
continued consolidation among health insurers and increased
competitive pressures will demonstrate the likelihood that insurers
will continue to attempt to weed out physicians whose treatment
costs are above average, whether due to legitimate aspects of the
physicians' practice styles, patient advocacy, or other factors.
This Note will argue that the strongest method of protecting
physician interests in the continually changing managed care
environment is through the enactment of strong procedural
protections for deselected physicians rather than through prohibi-
tions against deselection on the basis of certain protected activities.
While state legislative action is the preferred method of ensuring
procedural protections for physicians, Potvin and Harper demon-
strate that existing common law doctrines are flexible enough to
handle the implications of this emerging trend.
In the absence of state legislative action, courts can and should
provide minimal procedural safeguards against abuses in physician
deselection by reading the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing into physician-MCO contracts. Using state and federal
statutes as a basis for determining the current boundaries of public
policy, courts should provide for the following: a notice period for
physicians facing deselection; the opportunity for physicians who
believe their termination is sought on improper bases to have an
administrative review where they may challenge the termination;
the ability for physicians to view evidence against them and have an
attorney or other representative present at the review; the involve-
ment of an unbiased physician at the review if the termination is
7. 997 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 2000).
8. See infra note 142.
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made on medical grounds; and lastly, access to judicial review to
ensure such procedures are followed.
Part I of this Note will examine physician deselection, how it is
accomplished, and what effect it has on physicians and their
patients. Part II will consider particular arguments for and against
extending greater protections to physicians facing deselection. Part
III will examine case law developments relating to physician
deselection, including Harper and Potvin. Part IV will suggest and
examine two hypotheses for the failure of the predicted trend of
Harper- and Potvin-type decisions spreading to other jurisdictions
across the country. This Part will examine the possibility that (1)
state legislatures have already adequately dealt with MCO
deselection abuses, and/or (2) health insurance markets have
stabilized enough that where improper physician deselections are
no longer a concern. Part IV will argue that neither state legislative
developments nor conditions in health insurance markets eliminate
the need for further judicial intervention in this area. Lastly, in Part
V, this Note will suggest that courts adopt the Harper approach of
employing the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to
provide procedural protections to physicians facing deselection, and
will consider the optimal shape of those protections.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICIAN DESELECTION
A. Deselection Defined
Physician deselection occurs when a managed care organization
removes a physician from the group of providers authorized to
receive reimbursement in return for treating the MCO's patients. 9
9. See Liang, supra note 2, at 800-01 ("Deselection works through contract principles.
Physicians who enter into agreements to serve as providers for MCOs must generally accept
the standard 'termination without cause' clauses, which allow either party to terminate the
contract with some specified time of notice for any or no reason at all.") (footnotes omitted).
A broad definition of deselection is best, given the large variety of health insurance models
existing in the United States today. This Note will use the term "managed care organization,"
or MCO, broadly to represent the full spectrum of health insurance models ranging from a
loose preferred provider network to a highly regimented health maintenance organization.
The only major form of health insurance specifically excluded from this definition of MCO are
traditional, fee-for-service plans. For more information comparing the functional differences
among the different types of health insurance plans, see America's Health Insurance Plans,
2006] 681
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Although deselection is based on contract principles, ° the signifi-
cant power of MCOs in many geographical markets, and the
negative consequences that can occur when physicians are dese-
lected, raise concerns that transcend pure contract law. In fact, for
the physicians who are being deselected, the economic effects can be
equivalent to being fired."
Deselection is typically accomplished through MCO use of
provisions in their contracts allowing either "with cause" or "without
cause" termination of physicians. Historically, without cause
terminations have been the preferred method of removing a
physician from an MCO's provider list." Clauses allowing MCOs to
terminate their affiliation with a physician "are almost universally
present in physician/MCO provider agreements."'" Without-cause
termination clauses are also particularly susceptible to abuse by
MCOs, because they can be used to mask a decision to terminate for
reasons that violate public policy.'4 Indeed, the Potvin court found
the use of a without-cause termination provision to be unenforceable
when it conflicted with a physician's common law right to fair
procedure. 5
Because a physician's relationship with an MCO "is not an
employer-employee relationship,"' 6 and the physician is not "really
an independent contractor for" the MCO,'7 a physician can be left
Guide to Managed Care: What are My Health Plan Choices?, http://www.ahip.org/
content/default.aspx?bc=41 1 3291353#choices (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
10. See Liang, supra note 2, at 800 n.6 & 801.
11. Liner, supra note 3, at 516 ("Whether MCOs use the term 'deselection,' 'delistment,'
or 'disenrollment,' the translation for the physician remains the same, termination."); see also
infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Allred & Daniel, supra note 2, at 351 ("Provider deselection ... typically is
accomplished through the use of 'termination without cause' provisions."); Liner, supra note
3, at 513 (stating that when an MCO's determination to sever a relationship with a physician
is based on economic grounds, "MCOs can discretely accomplish this by invoking the
termination-without-cause provision in the provider contract").
13. Allred & Daniel, supra note 2, at 351.
14. For a discussion of motivations to deselect physicians that violate public policy, see
infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
15. Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 2000).
16. Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 965 (N.H. 1996); see N.J.
Psychological Ass'n v. MCC Behavioral Care, Inc., No. 96-CV-3080, 1997 WL 33446538, at *3
(D.N.J. Sept. 17, 1997).
17. Harper, 674 A.2d at 965.
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without recognized legal recourse to challenge the basis for the
termination.18
B. Common Bases for Physician Deselection
MCOs deselect physicians for a variety of reasons: some of which
are recognized as permissible, and some not.'9 This Section will
discuss some of the most common, but is not meant to be exhaus-
tive.
An obvious, and clearly legitimate, basis for an MCO to seek to
deselect a physician from its provider network is poor quality of
care. Falling under this classification are "issues of board certifica-
tion, pending disciplinary or malpractice actions, as well as sexual
harassment or other improper conduct." ° MCOs have a duty to their
enrollees to ensure that network physicians will not cause them
harm or behave inappropriately toward them.2' As one commentator
noted, 'MCOs are increasingly taking on the role that hospitals had
in an earlier era, in terms of credentialing and otherwise vouching
for the quality of care provided by their physicians."22 Given that
MCOs are increasingly assuming the responsibility to ensure
network physicians are competent, it is entirely appropriate that
MCOs have procedures in place to remove potentially dangerous
providers from access to their enrollees.
Legitimate business motives on the part of the MCO are also a
valid reason for physician deselection. Like any business, MCOs
must be able to reduce the size of their networks and their overhead
costs should business conditions necessitate such action. Courts
have traditionally been deferential to business decisions in the
18. See Liang, supra note 2, at 804 ("Many physicians have been deselected under a
termination without cause clause; the few who have challenged these terminations have
generally been denied relief.").
19. Linda C. Fentiman, Patient Advocacy and Termination from Managed Care
Organizations. Do State Laws Protecting Health Care Professional Advocacy Make Any
Difference?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 508, 522 (2003).
20. Id.
21. Id. ("(Miore and more courts are holding MCOs vicariously liable for the negligence
of network [health care providers] .... ).
22. Id. at 522 n.55.
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sphere of traditional employment relationships.23 Because MCO-
physician contractual relationships are not employer-employee
relationships, 4 MCOs ought to maintain at least as much control
over their deselection decisions as they do over their employment
decisions.
Included within legitimate business reasons for deselecting
physicians are the winnowing down of large provider panels that
MCOs tend to accumulate to attract enrollees when they first enter
a new market25 and the elimination of excess physician capacity
following mergers and acquisitions between MCOs.26 Further, the
medical needs of a given geographic area will change over time, and
MCOs should be able to assemble a provider panel that reflects
those needs.2 7 Unless MCO cost-controlling strategies become so
onerous as to put patients at risk, MCOs should be entitled to
deference in the area of financial and business determinations.
Deference to legitimate business rationale should not extend to
any and all physician deselections based on raw economic criteria,
however. The propriety of physician deselections based on highly
23. See, e.g., Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2001) ("This Court affords a high
degree of deference to employers in their hiring and promotion decisions."); Hutson v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir. 1995) ("It has become a commonplace for
this court to observe ... that the employment-discrimination laws have not vested in the
federal courts the authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or
fairness of the business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those
judgments involve intentional discrimination."); Baez v. Yeshiva Univ., No. 99 CIV. 11644
(HB) 2000 WL 1897792, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2000) ("This Court may not second-guess an
employer's non-discriminatory business decisions, even if those decisions are illogical or
unwise."). Though these cases arise in the employment discrimination context, the sentiments
translate into the less-scrutinized area of business decisions concerning contractual
relationships.
24. See, e.g., Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 965 (N.H. 1996) ("Strictly
speaking, [plaintiffs] relationship with [his MCO] is not an employer-employee relationship.").
25. For a description of how such a winnowing process typically is accomplished, see
Stephen E. Roth, Physician Deselection Under Attack: Will Without Cause Termination Soon
Be a Thing of the Past?, HEALTH LAW., Apr. 1999, at 1, 3.
26. For an example of the merger deselection scenario, see Sammarco v. Anthem Ins. Cos.,
723 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). The court in Sammarco held that the use of without-
cause deselections following the merger of several MCOs did not violate public policy. Id. at
132-35.
27. See Fentiman, supra note 19, at 522 ("[B]road changes in national and local health
care markets, such as the evolving medical needs of MCO enrollees and the need to
reconfigure relationships with hospitals, can lead MCOs to deselect HCPs who no longer meet
their needs.").
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specific financial analyses of individual physicians' practice styles
is an unsettled issue. Such analyses are known as "economic
credentialing."" One commentator describes the rise of economic
credentialing as an emerging "gray area" and defines the problem
as "whether it is appropriate to deselect HCPs [Health Care
Providers] due to their overutilization of diagnostic, specialist, and
inpatient resources, particularly if these services are provided out
of network."29 MCOs, for the most part, are for-profit enterprises
and thus have an inherent interest in maintaining lower cost
physicians in their networks, while cutting ties with physicians
whose practice costs are significantly above average.3 ° Although
numerous authors have discussed the financial incentives for MCOs
to deselect physicians with higher-than-average treatment costs,
there appears to be no consensus as to when such "economic
credentialing" moves from being a legitimate business tool to being
impermissible MCO interference with the ability of doctors to
practice medicine. This lack of consensus underscores why it is
important for courts to evaluate physician deselection litigation by
focusing on procedural protections for physicians, rather than on
bright line tests for economic credentialing in the absence of broad
agreement.3'
28. The American Medical Association defines economic credentialing as "the application
of economic criteria unrelated to quality of care or professional competence to decisions
concerning appointment, reappointment, or delineation of staff privileges." Liner, supra note
3, at 513 n.8 (quoting John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialing into Managed
Care Selective Contracting, 22 AM J.L. & MED. 173, 176 (1996)).
29. Fentiman, supra note 19, at 522.
30. Such "economic credentialing" is a widely used MCO cost containment tool: 'Most
MCOs operate as profit maximizing businesses by managing and underwriting health care.
MCOs make economic comparisons among treatment choices and use these evaluations for
credentialing purposes." Liner, supra note 3, at 517 (footnotes omitted); see also Allred &
Daniel, supra note 2, at 350 ('The twin objectives of maximizing profit and controlling cost
often force MCOs to terminate physician contracts in an effort to adjust their provider bases
for efficient provision of care."); Liner, supra note 3, at 513 ("[E]conomically based factors ...
have become prevalent in MCO credentialing. Sometimes, MCOs terminate providers for
purely economic reasons."); Roth, supra note 25, at 1 (noting that "[n]othing is more
fundamental to the effectiveness and profitability of ... MCOs D than the doctors they select
or employ. MCOs want to maximize their control over the composition of their panels of
physicians: they want to retain the best and most profitable and cut their ties to the others
with a minimum of fuss").
31. See infra notes 169 and 174 and accompanying text.
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Whereas the propriety of economic credentialing is a subject of
debate, there is a broad consensus among the medical community,
policymakers, and the general public that MCO restraints on the
ability of physicians to advocate for the needs of their patients are
contrary to public policy." One problematic MCO method of
curtailing physician advocacy is the use of "gag clauses," which were
reported on extensively during the 1990s.33 And because some courts
have found that physicians have a fiduciary duty to promote the
best interests of their patients,34 courts and legislatures should not
tolerate deselections aimed at retaliating against such advocacy.
The American Medical Association has placed patient advocacy
among the most important ethical responsibilities of physicians.35
In fact, "physicians are adjured to act as a patient advocate to
challenge a denial of care that the physician believes will materially
benefit the patient, and are even mandated to initiate appeals on
behalf of their patients in certain circumstances." 6 Given the value
32. For a detailed discussion of physician deselection from a patient advocacy perspective,
see generally Fentiman, supra note 19. For the purposes of this Note, the term "advocacy" will
be used generally to describe any form of physician intervention with MCO policies or
coverage determinations on behalf of one or more patients, whether within or outside of MCO
appeal channels.
33. See id. at 510. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (formerly the
General Accounting Office):
A commonly understood definition of a gag clause is a contract provision that
limits physicians' ability to advise patients of all medically appropriate
treatment options.... Most agree that language that prevents physicians from
giving patients complete information about their medical care choices or
restricts the timing of such discussions is a gag clause.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MANAGED CARE: EXPICIT GAG CLAUSES NOT FOUND IN
HMO CONTRACTS, BUT PHYSICIAN CONCERNS REMAIN 5 (1997), available at http://www.
gao.gov/archive/1997/he97175.pdf. As the title of the report suggests, the agency found no
explicit gag clauses in the 529 HMOs it surveyed. Id. at 3.
34. Fentiman, supra note 19, at 516-19 (discussing cases from California, New York, and
Delaware).
35. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE CODE, E-8.13(1): Managed Care (2002),
available at http://www.ama-assn.orgtama/pub/category/2498.html (follow "Current opinions"
hyperlink) ('CThe duty of patient advocacy is a fundamental element of the patient-physician
relationship that should not be altered by the system of health care delivery."); see Fentiman,
supra note 19, at 514-16.
36. Id. at 515 (footnotes omitted). Other authors report that under the AMA guidelines,
"abiding by certain gag rules could subject AMA physicians to sanctions." Mark A. Kadzielski,
Provider Deselection and Decapitation in a Changing Healthcare Environment, 41 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 891, 909 (1997).
[Vol. 48:677686
PHYSICIAN DESELECTION DISPUTES
that the medical community and the courts have placed on physi-
cian advocacy, reviewing courts should strongly discourage MCO
deselections that are meant to punish such behavior.
II. PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO PHYSICIAN DESELECTION ABUSES
A. Arguments Favoring Greater Legislative and Judicial
Involvement
1. The Impact of Deselection on Physicians
When the majority of health insurance plans in the United States
were fee-for-service plans, the implications for physicians of signing
terminable-at-will insurer contracts were much less disastrous than
they are today." Because fee-for-service plans generally pay for
medical services provided by any health care provider,3" the health
insurer traditionally did not play a significant mediating role in
determining which patients saw which doctors.
In a modern MCO, the insurer becomes a significant, and perhaps
the most significant, factor in creating and maintaining physician-
patient relationships. Because MCOs operate by building relation-
ships with a network of physicians and then only covering their
insured's medical expenses incurred within the provider network,
the financial incentives for patients to seek care from in-network
physicians are enormous. As one commentator explained, "[i]n the
fee for service era, patients could choose their doctors with virtually
no limitations. However, that is no longer the case under managed
care.... [T]he patient's control over the relationship is significantly
lessened."39 The financial incentives built into the "unique tripartite
relationship among an insurance company, its insureds, and the
physicians who participate in the preferred provider network,"4 °
ensure that the MCO controls which physicians its insureds will
37. See Liang, supra note 2, at 801 ("Before managed care dominance, physicians were
happy to sign contracts with such clauses.").
38. America's Health Insurance Plans, supra note 9.
39. Roth, supra note 25, at 5.
40. Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Cal. 2000).
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seek out.41 If a physician loses her in-network status, she essentially
loses access to the MCO's patients and the revenue they represent
for her practice.
As MCOs have become the dominant player in group health
insurance,42 physicians have "come to rely on MCO contracts for
their patient base, income, and marketability. ''4' This reality has led
physician professional associations to declare that "access to [MCO]
provider panels [is] a 'practical prerequisite' to any effective practice
as a health care provider. 44 Naturally, as physician reliance on
MCO affiliation has grown, the consequences of deselection from an
MCO's provider panel have increased correspondingly.45
Being deselected from an MCO provider network can bring
consequences graver than simply losing access to the MCO's
insureds, however. A deselection decision also carries
enormous long-term consequences for the HCP's income, ego,
and reputation. An MCO's action in ending its relationship with
an HCP can often have a crippling economic domino effect. As
the MCO's decision becomes known to state or federal regulatory
bodies as well as other insurers or health plans, an HCP,
particularly one who is a specialist, can quickly face a sharp fall-
off in referrals from other HCPs. In other cases, an HCP's
hospital staff privileges can be threatened.46
41. See id. at 1159.
42. See Liner, supra note 3, at 514 (citing statistics that less than 10 percent of patients
were insured through MCOs in 1970, compared with over 50 percent in 1996); MCOL,
Managed Care National Statistics, http://www.mcareol.com/factshts/factnati.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2006) (listing statistics that 142.8 million Americans, or 86.12 percent of all Americans
with private (nongovernmental) health insurance are in a managed care model plan).
43. Liner, supra note 3, at 513 (footnotes omitted).
44. Potuin, 997 P.2d at 1160 (quoting joint amicus brief of the American Medical
Association and the California Medical Association).
45. The importance of remaining on an MCO's provider panel is compounded in cases in
which a single MCO dominates a geographic insurance market. The opinion in Potuin
recognized that in some regions, because of a single MCO having dominant market share, "the
insurer possesses power so substantial that the removal [from that insurer's network]
significantly impairs the ability of an ordinary, competent physician to practice medicine or
a medical specialty" in the area. Id. For physicians in these regions, the implication is that
MCO affiliation is not only the best way for a physician to run a successful practice, it may be
the only way. See infra Part TV.C for a discussion of several insurer-dominated markets.
46. Fentiman, supra note 19, at 572.
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Because of such implications, deselection decisions cause as much
disruption to physicians' careers as does termination for those in
standard employer-employee relationships."
As MCOs have attained the status of quasi-employers for
physicians, they not only serve as a source of physicians' income,
but also effectively serve as unofficial credentialing entities for
physicians. As one commentator noted, 'MCOs are increasingly
taking on the role that hospitals had in an earlier era, in terms of
credentialing and otherwise vouching for the quality of care
provided by their physicians."4 When one MCO terminates its
relationship with a particular physician, nearby MCOs, physician
groups, and hospitals that are aware of the deselection decision will
be wary of adding that physician to their provider panels.4"
The operation of the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) °
in physician deselection scenarios is also important in considering
the economic impact that MCO terminations carry for physicians.
The NPDB was established under the authority of the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 198651 and serves as a nationwide
clearinghouse for information on unethical or incompetent physi-
cians, thus preventing physicians from being sanctioned in one state
and then moving to a second to resume the practice of medicine.52
47. In fact, it is easy to see why physician deselection carries with it more negative
consequences than being terminated from most jobs. For example, when an administrative
assistant in one part of a city is fired, whether he deserves it or not, he can likely find a new
job across town without much additional difficulty due to the firing. This is because, in most
jobs, there are simply no licensing and accreditation requirements analogous to those faced
by physicians. Further, the community of physicians in a given metropolitan area is probably
smaller and more interconnected than is the community of administrative assistants in the
same city.
48. Fentiman, supra note 19, at 522 n.55.
49. Liner, supra note 3, at 517 ("A deselected physician loses more than patients and
income. Other MCOs are less likely to have an interest in a deselected physician." (footnotes
omitted)). In Potvin, the plaintiff alleged "that among the adverse effects of removal from
MetLife's preferred provider lists were rejection by physician groups which were dependent
upon credentialling by MetLife." Potuin, 997 P.2d at 1160-61 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
50. 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.01-.14 (1994).
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2000).
52. As Fentiman states,
[The NPDB is] a national clearinghouse for information about incompetent
HCPs, [that limits] these HCPs' ability to move from state to state and continue
to practice their profession even after disciplinary action has been taken against
them in another state. Actions that must be reported to the NPDB include state
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The MCO deselection process can lead a physician to be reported to
the NPDB, 53 thus further endangering the professional prospects of
a deselected physician.
In these ways, deselection carries at least as many significant
negative financial consequences as a termination. The effect of
deselection on physicians provides a strong reason for extending
some of the protections enjoyed by workers in standard employment
relationships to physicians facing deselection.
2. Analogous Principles in the Employment Law Context
Although physician-MCO contractual relationships are not true
employment relationships, 4 an examination of the principles
applicable to employer-employee relationships is helpful in identify-
ing how courts and legislatures can shape protections for physicians
facing deselection. In American jurisdictions, there is a presumption
that an employment relationship is "at will," meaning that either
side can terminate the relationship for any reason, or for no reason
at all.55 Yet, the right of employers to fire at-will employees for any
reason whatsoever has been drastically curtailed over the past sixty
years.56 As one commentator bluntly puts it, "the legal right to fire
disciplinary actions against physicians or dentists relating to that person's
professional competence or conduct; adverse HCP clinical privileges decisions
made by hospitals and other health care entities, including HMOs and
professional societies; exclusions of HCPs from the Medicare and Medicaid
programs; Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) actions to revoke the
registration of a HCP (i.e. the ability to write prescriptions), and; all medical
malpractice awards paid by anyone other than the HCP himself (i.e., a
malpractice insurer, medical group, or hospital).
Fentiman, supra note 19, at 525-26 n.69; accord Liang, supra note 2, at 804 n.19.
53. See Fentiman, supra note 19, at 525 n.69; Liang, supra note 2, at 804 n.19
("[Tlermination which affects clinical and medical staff privileges must be reported to the
[NPDB] ....").
54. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
55. MARKA. ROTHSTEIN ETAL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.27 (3d ed. 2005) ("The American rule
is that oral contracts of indefinite duration (the most common form of employment contract)
are presumed to be 'at will' contracts."); e.g., Bradshaw v. Brown Group, Inc., 258 F.3d 847,
849 (8th Cir. 2001); Wesson v. Huntsman Corp., 206 F.3d 1150, 1154 (11th Cir. 2000); Lytle
v. Malady, 579 N.W.2d 906, 910 (Mich. 1998); County of Giles v. Wines, 546 S.E.2d 721, 723
(Va. 2001).
56. Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1655, 1655 (1996). Only one state has abrogated the at-will employment doctrine by
statute. See PETER 0. HUGHES, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 259.04 (MB 2005), available
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for bad reasons has been virtually decimated."57 Recognized
exceptions to the doctrine of at-will employment include federal and
state statutory prohibitions," collective bargaining agreements,59
and considerations of public policy.6" An employee who feels his
termination is in violation of public policy can bring the common law
tort claim of wrongful discharge. 1
Most relevant to the current discussion are employment ter-
minations that violate statutory prohibitions62 or those that violate
public policy. All fifty states and the federal government have
enacted statutory exceptions to the doctrine of employment at
will, with frequent examples including statutes barring termination
on the basis of race, sex, religion, disability, or age. 3 Remedies for
employees terminated in violation of a state or federal statute
vary.' In some cases, the statutory right overcomes any common
law wrongful termination claim that the employee might have had.6"
In others, the employee can bring an action on either basis. 6 Other
statutes require the terminated employee to pursue an administra-
tive, rather than judicial, remedy.6"
Even if no statute explicitly proscribes the basis for an employee's
termination, the employee may have a claim for wrongful discharge
if the basis of the termination violates public policy. In general, for
such a claim to succeed, the policy involved must be substantial and
at LEXIS, LEXSTAT 10-259 (discussing a Montana statute).
57. Estlund, supra note 56, at 1655.
58. Examples of such statutes include the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000), and the federal statute protecting against government civil rights
violations, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
59. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 55, § 9.1.
60. Id. § 9.9.
61. HUGHES, supra note 56, § 259.05.
62. Approximately thirty states have enacted some form of statutory limitations on the
ability of MCOs to terminate contractual relations with physicians arbitrarily or on short
notice. See infra Figure I.
63. HUGHES, supra note 56, § 259.04.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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important,68 and affect the rights of the public at large, not solely
those of an individual. 9
Closely tied to the concept of the public policy exception to at-will
employment is the common law doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing. ° Under this doctrine, courts read into every contract an
implied provision that neither party will act in a way to deprive the
other party of "the fruits of the contract."'" Some courts hold that
because the employment relationship is contractual, it is subject to
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as well.72 Courts in
a majority of jurisdictions, however, have refused to extend the
implied covenant into the context of at-will employment relation-
ships.73
68. See, e.g., Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1992) ("[The [public] policy
must be fundamental, substantial and well established at the time of the discharge."
(quotations omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046,
1054 n.6 (Cal. 1998); Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 454 (Minn.
2006) (stating that in Minnesota and other states, the common law public-policy exception to
the at-will employment doctrine applies only when the policies at issue are "clear"); Berube
v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 (Utah 1989) (holding that the court would recognize
only those public policies that "are so substantial and fundamental that there can be virtually
no question as to their importance for promotion of the public good.").
69. For example, one state court explained what it takes for a public policy to rise to the
level of abrogating the at-will employment doctrine:
[I]t can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what
affects the citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in the State's
constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions.
Although there is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the
subject of public policies from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other
States involving retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike at the
heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will
be allowed.
Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (InI. 1981) (citation omitted).
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (adopting the doctrine).
71. Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933). This phrase has
been frequently used by courts.
72. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 55, § 9.6 (stating that "[a] little more than one-fifth
of the states permit the use of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing to
challenge discharges").
73. The Rothstein treatise explains the uncomfortable place of the implied covenant in the
law of wrongful discharge, noting that "most courts have rejected the application of the
doctrine to employment contracts because of concerns that the doctrine is amorphous, too
broad, and destructive of employer prerogatives." Id. Further, "[miost courts view the
invocation of the implied covenant as the plaintiff's attempt to impose a just cause
requirement on an employment relationship as a matter of law, where, as a matter of fact, the
relationship is at will." Id.
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Despite the limited acceptance of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the employment context, good reasons exist
for courts to fully utilize the doctrine into the less-regulated area of
MCO-physician contracting. The long history of case law in
American jurisdictions upholding the presumption of at-will
employment simply does not exist in the area of physician
deselection. Because courts rejecting the doctrine in the employment
context have viewed the implied covenant as an attempted end run
around the policy of employment at will,74 the lack of a strong body
of case law regarding physician deselection disputes argues in favor
of a broadly interpretation of the covenant in MCO-physician
contracts.
The relationship between a physician and an MCO is not a perfect
analogue to the relationship of an employer to an employee.
Whereas under managed care, deselected physicians face economic
consequences similar to those of terminated employees,75 no
analogous body of common law and statutory protections exists for
physicians. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
thus more appropriate in the less-regulated area of MCO-physician
contracts than in the heavily regulated area of employment
relationships. Paradoxically, it is the breadth and adaptability of
the implied covenant-which has led courts to reject it in the
employment context-that makes it well-suited for bringing
employment-like protections to what has become an employment-
like relationship.76
3. Physician Deselection Affects Patient Health
The financial relationship between MCO, physician, and patient
ensures that a disruption in the physician-MCO relationship will
affect the care received by the patient. Courts that have addressed
the issue of physician deselection have recognized a public interest
in the relationship between MCOs and their affiliated physicians.77
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
76. See infra Part V.
77. See Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Cal. 2000) ("[Ihe relationship
between insurers and their preferred provider physicians significantly affects the public
interest .....); Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 966 (N.H. 1996) ('The public
2006] 693
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Further, a significant number of state legislatures have recognized
the public's interest in stable physician-patient relationships and
have passed statutes requiring that MCOs continue to reimburse
patient visits to recently terminated physicians for a specified time
period.7" Lastly, a number of studies have concluded that stability
in the patient-physician relationship contributes to a more positive
experience for patients, makes patients more likely to follow
suggested health regimens, lowers the number of hospitalizations
and emergency room visits, and lowers the costs of care.79
Although physicians' derivation of income from MCO contracts
has in many cases become sufficiently like an employment situation
to justify procedural protections against unjustified deselections, the
most important policy reason for scrutiny of deselection practices is
the effect they have on patient care.' ° Essentially, "deselection can
give rise to effects similar to patient abandonment."'" For MCO
enrollees, like all patients, the loss of a long-term physician-patient
relationship can have adverse health consequences. As one report
summarized,
[t]he traditional practice of medicine was built on a long-term
relationship with a single provider who knows the patient well
and who acts on behalf of the patient in difficult situations. It
takes time to develop such a relationship: some research
has a substantial interest in the relationship between health maintenance organizations and
their preferred provider physicians .... This relationship is perhaps the most important factor
in linking a particular physician with a particular patient.").
78. See, e.g., MD. CODEANN., INS. § 15-112(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2002) (ninety-day period); VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407.10(F) (2002) (same). States, however, generally make exceptions to
such requirements in cases where the physician was terminated "for cause," id., or for "fraud,
patient abuse, incompetency, or loss of licensure status," MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
112(b)(2)(ii).
79. GERRY FAIRBROTHER & ARFANA HAIDERY, NEW AM. FOUND. HEALTH POLICY PROGRAM,
How HEALTH INSURANCE STABILITY IMPACTS THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 7 (2005),
http://www.newamerica.net/files/archive/DocFile_2470-l.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2006)
(surveying research on the effects of a stable physician-patient relationship).
80. See Liner, supra note 3, at 513 ("Why, however, should the public, generally at risk
for losing their own jobs, grieve for doctors just because the current deselection process
jeopardizes their managed care contracts? The answer lies in the effect the physician's
relationship with the MCO has on the physician-patient relationship. While deselected
physicians may condemn the market and legal systems as betrayers of their economic security
and professional autonomy, patient care must remain the focal point of any inquiry into the
health care system.").
81. Id. at 528.
[Vol. 48:677694
PHYSICIAN DESELECTION DISPUTES
suggests that it may take as many as five years or four to five
visits in a single year for a physician to develop the knowledge
base to treat optimally and for a patient to trust the physician.
There are considerable advantages to building this level of
knowledge.... Physicians are more likely to perform additional
tests before prescribing when they do not have a sufficient
knowledge base on the patient and also are less likely to take a
"wait and see" approach in managing care. The physician's sense
of responsibility increases more rapidly with close connection to
their patient.1
2
By promoting stability in physician-patient relationships, legisla-
tures and courts can thus promote higher-quality and lower-cost
health care. Although there are legitimate and unavoidable reasons
that physician-patient relationships must be severed, the impact of
stable physician-patient relationships on public health is an
important public policy reason to promote stability in those
relationships when possible. A more vigilant legislative and judicial
response to physician deselection abuses would be one such way to
promote patient health.
B. Arguments Against Greater Legislative and Judicial
Involvement
Two arguments give pause to legislatures and courts considering
providing greater protections to physicians facing deselection. The
first can be found in the sentiments of Justice Brown's dissent in
Potvin, which began, "[w]ith its decision today, the majority, in
effect, declares that it is the public policy of this state that physi-
cians are entitled to a minimum income."8 The argument is
essentially that protection against deselection simply amounts to
income protection for physicians, who by any measure are not
generally the most impoverished class in our society. But to
characterize concerns over abuses in physician deselection as simply
an attempt to ensure adequate income for physicians fails to
account for the devastating professional ramifications that a
82. FAIRBROTHER & HAIDERY, supra note 80, at 6.
83. Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153,1162 (Cal. 2000) (Brown, J., dissenting).
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deselection decision carries," and also the negative impact on the
patients of the deselected physician.85
The second argument is that providing greater procedural
protections to physicians facing deselection from their MCO
affiliation will further increase the already steep cost of health
insurance. It is certainly true that the increasing cost of health
insurance has long outpaced the rate of inflation.86 Yet the cost
impact of providing assistance to physicians facing deselection-
specifically procedural protections ensuring notice and a meaningful
hearing before the deselection becomes final-remains a matter of
speculation. Although the initial cost impact of providing such
protections on health insurance premiums may be measurable, it is
conceivable that such an impact would be mitigated as MCOs
become more familiar with the new procedural requirements, reduce
the number of deselections they make for disfavored reasons, 7 and
better document their deselection decisions. Further, any increased
cost associated with protecting physicians from deselections that
violate public policy would be offset to some extent by the lowered
treatment costs and higher quality of care that result from a stable
physician-patient relationship. Although courts and, to a greater
extent, legislatures need to be mindful of the cost effects of their
pronouncements, the above factors will likely mitigate any potential
increase in the cost of health insurance from protecting physicians
facing deselection.
84. See supra Part II.A.1.
85. See supra Part II.A.3.
86. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS: 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY 16 (2005), available at http://www.kff.orglinsurancel
7315/upload/7315.pdf (reporting a 9.2 percent increase in the cost of health insurance for a
family of four in 2005, and a 73 percent increase in the cost of health insurance since 2000);
National Coalition on Health Care, Health Insurance Cost, http://www.nchc.org/facts/
cost.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
87. Legislative or judicial requirements for increased procedural protections for physicians
facing deselection will likely have the intended effect of forcing MCOs to treat physician
deselection decisions with caution and not exercise such power arbitrarily. See Allred &
Daniel, supra note 2, at 354-55 (discussing how MCOs should react to the Harper and Potvin
decisions in order to reduce the likelihood of successful litigation against them from deselected
physicians). Allred and Daniel recommend that MCOs rely on with-cause deselections when
possible, and that when they must invoke a without-cause provision, they should be prepared
to show that the deselection decision does not violate public policy and was made objectively,
in good faith, and following a well-documented and consistently applied termination process.
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III. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO PHYSICIAN DESELECTION
A. Harper v. Healthsource
In Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc.,8 defendant
MCO Healthsource New Hampshire moved to terminate plaintiff
Dr. Paul Harper after Harper reported concerns that Healthsource
was manipulating his treatment records. s9 Harper made multiple
requests for copies of documentation relied upon by the creden-
tialing committee in making its determination, but was refused.9"
After two Healthsource internal review panels ruled against him
(Harper did not attend the first review in protest of Healthsource's
refusal to share its evidence against him), Harper filed suit alleging,
among other things, that the termination without cause provision
in his contract with the MCO should be void as against public
policy.9' The trial court granted Healthsource's motion to dismiss
on all counts.92
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated that it would "not
enforce a contract or contract term that violate[d] public policy,"
and pointed to the common law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as a vehicle for the application of public policy to private
contracts.9 3 Noting that "[t]he public has a substantial interest in
the relationship between health maintenance organizations and
their preferred provider physicians," the court determined that an
MCO's deselection decisions "must comport with the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and may not be made for a reason that
is contrary to public policy."94 Although refusing to hold that
without-cause termination clauses in physician-MCO contracts
88. 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996).
89. Id. at 963.
90. Id. at 963-64.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 963.
93. Id. at 965. The court also elaborated that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing "excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because
they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness." Id. at 965-66
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981)).
94. Id. at 966.
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were per se violations of public policy, 9 5 the court stated that "[i]f a
physician's relationship [with an MCO] ... is terminated without
cause and the physician believes that the decision to terminate was
... made in bad faith or based upon some factor that would render
the decision contrary to public policy, then the physician is entitled
to review of the decision."' Having found that such a right existed,
the court ruled that Harper's claim could proceed on the merits.97
B. New Jersey Psychological Ass'n
In New Jersey Psychological Ass'n v. MCC Behavioral Care, Inc.,s"
the plaintiffs, a state professional organization and several of its
members brought suit against the defendant MCO for the termina-
tion of the plaintiffs after the MCO deemed them "not managed care
compatible."99 The plaintiffs alleged that the MCO based its
termination on the types of treatment regimens plaintiffs were
recommending to their patients and then attempted to avoid added
scrutiny by labeling the termination as without cause. 0
The court stated that employees in New Jersey have a common
law right to challenge both with- and without-cause terminations
that violate public policy.1"1 While noting that there was no
employer-employee relationship between plaintiffs and MCC, the
federal court nonetheless concluded that there was "sufficient
suggestion ... under the facts alleged by plaintiffs" that the New
Jersey Supreme Court "would countenance such a cause of action in
this case. ' ' The Court determined that two expressions of public
policy precluded granting the defendant's motion to dismiss: (1)
state case law that imposed a fair hearing before physician staff
privileges with a hospital could be terminated, and (2) a newly
95. Id. ("A terminated physician is entitled to review of the termination decision under
this standard, whether the termination was for cause, or without cause. This rule does not
eliminate a health maintenance organization's contractual right to terminate its relationship
with a physician without cause.").
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. No. 96-CV-3080, 1997 WL 33446538 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 1997).
99. Id. at *1.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *3.
102. Id.
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adopted New Jersey statute requiring greater physician involve-
ment in MCO utilization review decisions and policies. °3
Following the trial court's decision in New Jersey Psychological
Ass'n, the parties subsequently settled the suit in 2000.1"4 The
settlement agreement included an undisclosed financial settlement,
as well as a pledge by CIGNA, the successor to MCC Behavioral
Associates, to enact a number of procedural protections to psycholo-
gists facing deselection.'0 5
C. Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
Decided in 2000, Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.106 is
the most recent major court decision on physician deselection.
Plaintiff Dr. Felix Potvin was a past president of the Orange County
Medical Association and had served for nine years as Chairman of
the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department at Mission Regional
Hospital in Mission Viejo, Orange County, California." 7 Dr. Potvin
entered into an affiliation with MetLife, the defendant MCO, in
1990.108 Fewer than two years later, MetLife notified Potvin that it
was terminating him without cause."°9 After Potvin pressed for an
explanation, he was eventually informed that he did not meet
MetLife's retention standards due to the history of malpractice
claims against him.1 0 Although Dr. Potvin had had four malpractice
claims brought against him in his career-three dropped without
recovery-each had been brought before Potvin's 1990 affiliation
103. Id. at **3-4. The only court that has cited the federal court opinion in New Jersey
Psychological Ass'n is an Ohio appellate court, which held, in Sammarco v. Anthem Insurance
Co., that the implied doctrine of good faith and fair dealing does not apply to physician-MCO
contracts. 723 N.E.2d 128, 135-36 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
104. Alan Nessman & Paul Herndon, New Jersey Settlement Offers Strong Protections for
Psychologists, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Dec. 2000, available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/
decO0/njlaw.html.
105. See id.
106. 997 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 2000).
107. Id. at 1155.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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with MetLife."' MetLife did not respond to Potvin's requests for a
hearing.'12
The Supreme Court of California agreed with Potvin that
MetLife's actions implicated California's common law right to fair
procedure. 1 ' The court explained that the right to fair procedure
applied to private entities that affect the public interest:
[C]ertain institutions and enterprises are viewed by the courts
as quasi-public in nature: The important products or services
which these enterprises provide, their express or implied
representations to the public concerning their products or
services, their superior bargaining power, legislative recognition
of their public aspect, or a combination of these factors, lead
courts to impose on these enterprises obligations to the public
and the individuals with whom they deal ... apart from and in
some cases despite the existence of a contract.1
14
The court pointed out that following the MCO revolution, "patients
are less free to choose their own doctors for they must obtain
medical services from providers approved by their health plan."
' 15
Because health care delivery now occurs through a "unique
tripartite relationship among an insurance company, its insureds,
and the physicians who participate in the preferred provider
network," the court concluded that "the relationship between
insurers and their preferred provider physicians significantly affects
the public interest.""6 The processes by which MCOs deselect
physicians thus "must be both substantively rational and procedur-
ally fair.""' 7
Despite this logic, the court restricted the reach of its decision in
a way that the Harper court did not. The Potvin court explicitly
limited the applicability of the right to fair procedure to situations
in which "the insurer possesses power so substantial that the
111. Id. at 1155-56.
112. Id. at 1156.
113. Id. at 1161.
114. Id. at 1159 (quoting Matthew 0. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the
Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1253 (1967)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1160.
117. Id. at 1161 (quoting Pinsker v. Pac. Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253, 260
(Cal. 1974)).
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removal significantly impairs the ability of an ordinary, competent
physician to practice medicine or a medical specialty in a particular
geographic area, thereby affecting an important, substantial
economic interest."' Thus, while both the Harper and Potvin courts
found clauses in physician-MCO contracts that permitted without-
cause terminations to be unenforceable so far as they violated
important common law rights, the Potvin court restricted its holding
to insurers holding large market shares."'
IV. WHY HAS THE HARPERIPOTVIN TREND FAILED To
MATERIALIZE? AN ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE AND
MARKET DEVELOPMENT
A. Theories on the Failure of a Harper/Potvin Trend To
Materialize
Despite predictions that Harper and Potvin represented a trend
that other states would follow, 2 ° no other state has adopted common
law procedural protections for physicians facing deselection in the
five years since Potvin. Two possible reasons for this failure are (1)
state legislatures have acted effectively to provide protections to
physicians affiliated with MCOs and thus legal disputes regarding
deselection have diminished, or (2) such activity is no longer
necessary because market conditions are such that MCOs are
unlikely to repeat past abuses of deselection procedures. This
Section addresses each of these possibilities in turn.
B. Legislative Protections for Physicians Facing Deselection
The first theory, that state legislatures have already addressed
the problem of physician deselection, is not borne out by the
following survey of state legislative enactments. Only approximately
one dozen states have enacted comprehensive statutory protections
for physicians facing deselection.' 2 ' Roughly twenty states have
118. Id. at 1160.
119. See id. at 1161-62; Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 964-66 (N.H.
1996).
120. Allred & Daniel, supra note 2, at 354; Roth, supra note 25, at 5.
121. See infra Figure I.
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enacted no statutory protections at all.'22 Thus, while a minority of
states have enacted serious statutory protections for physicians
facing deselections, the argument that courts need not involve
themselves with a matter adequately addressed by state legilatures
cannot be sustained.
1. An Overview of State Statutes
As horror stories spread about patient abuses at the hands of
MCO cost-cutting regimes, 123 state legislatures responded by
passing legislation aimed at protecting physician advocacy and
patients' rights. '24 State laws offering protection to physicians facing
deselection, however, have come more slowly.125 Currently, approxi-
mately thirty states have statutes offering some level of protec-
tion-however minimal-to physicians facing the deselection
process.'26 Yet, some of these statutes provide only for a notice
period before the termination becomes final.'27 Approximately one
dozen states provide comprehensive statutory protection for
deselected physicians, including provisions such as a requirement
that MCOs inform physicians of the credentialing criteria they use
to determine physician retention and deselection; a notice period
122. See infra Figure I.
123. See, e.g., Larry Katzenstein, Beyond the Horror Stories, Good News About Managed
Care, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1999, at WH6.
124. Fentiman, supra note 19, at 510-11 ("As horror stories circulated of risk-sharing
arrangements that lead to denial of medically necessary care, Draconian utilization review,
Igagging' of physicians in their communications with patients, and as many patients began
to have more impersonal and transient relationships with their doctors, there was an
inevitable backlash against managed care's goals of cost containment and the more active and
effective management of patient care.") (footnotes omitted)).
125. For a history of the development of state legislative responses to managed care abuses,
see Alice A. Noble & Troyen A. Brennan, The Stages of Managed Care Regulation: Developing
Better Rules, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 1275, 1280-96 (1999). Significant tension exists
between state regulation of health insurance and the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA"), which has a powerful preemptive effect on any matter "relating to"
an employee benefits plan. ERISA's preemption provision is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(2000). See generally Fentiman, supra note 19, at 550-62 (discussing ERISA in detail and
concluding that the Supreme Court would likely find that state statutes protecting advocacy
are not preempted by ERISA). Despite the obvious importance of ERISA, it is outside the
scope of this argument, and this Note will presume that any statutory or common law
responses to physician deselection are not preempted by ERISA.
126. See infra Figure I.
127. See infra Figure I.
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before a deselection becomes final, typically ninety days; a require-
ment that MCOs provide the reasons for the deselection to the
physician; a review hearing at which the physician can challenge
the deselection; and specific protections for patient advocacy. 2 '
Figure I below contains a state-by-state breakdown of statutory
protections.
128. The information contained in the following paragraph and in Figure I is from the
author's own research. Distinctions between "minimal" and "comprehensive" statutory
protections are necessarily subjective.
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Figure I
State Statutory Protections Applicable Statutes
Alabama No statute
Alaska Statute requiring dispute reso- ALASKA STAT.
lution procedure; protecting § 21.07.010 (1962).
open communication with and
advocacy on behalf of patients
Arizona No statute
Arkansas No statute
California Statutes protecting advocacy CA. Bus. & PROF.
and requiring MCOs to provide CODE § 510 (West
economic review criteria to 2003); id. § 2056;
physicians CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE
§ 1367.02 (West
2000).
Colorado Limited statutory protection COLO. REV. STAT.
requiring sixty days written ANN. § 10-16-705
notice before without-cause (2005).
terminations; no review
procedure requirements
Connecticut Statutes requiring notice CONN. GEN. STAT.
period, appeal procedures, ANN. § 38a-226c
protection for advocacy, and (West 2000); id.
provision of economic criteria to § 38a-478h (West
physicians 2006); id. § 38a-
479aa (West 2006).
Delaware Statute requiring notice period DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
and mandating review proce- 18, § 3339 (1974).
dure; protects advocacy
District of Co- No statute
lumbia
Florida Limited statutory protection FLA. STAT. ANN.
requiring notice period and § 641.315 (West
reason for termination; specifi- 2005).
cally creates no right of action
based on reason provided
704 [Vol. 48:677
PHYSICIAN DESELECTION DISPUTES
Georgia No statute
Hawaii No statute
Idaho Statute requiring notice of IDAHO CODE ANN.
breach and a reasonable time to § 41-3927 (2003).
cure it prior to termination for
"breach of contract"
Illinois No statute
Indiana No statute
Iowa No statute
Kansas No statute
Kentucky Statute adopting the standards KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
for professional review actions § 304.17A-525
in health care settings set by 42 (LexisNexis 2001).
U.S.C. § 11112
Louisiana Statutory protection for advo- LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
cacy only § 40:2207 (2001).
Maine Comprehensive statute requir- ME. REV. STAT.
ing notice period, reasons for ANN. tit. 24-A,
termination, mandatory review § 4303 (1964).
procedures, and protection for
advocacy
Maryland Statutory protection for advo- MD. CODE ANN.,
cacy; requires notice and estab- INS. § 15-112
lishment of review procedures; (LexisNexis 2005
specifically creates no private Supp.).
right of action based on certain
procedures related to
participation in provider panels
Massachusetts Comprehensive statute MASS. GEN. LAWS
requiring notice period, ANN. ch. 176B, § 7
reasons for termination, and (West 1998).
review procedures
Michigan Statute requiring notice and, MICH. COMP. LAWS
upon physician's request, writ- ANN. § 500.3531
ten reasons for termination (West 2002).
Minnesota Statute requiring notice only MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 62D.123 (West
_2005).
Mississippi No statute I
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Missouri Comprehensive statute requir- Mo. ANN. STAT.
ing notice period, reasons for § 354.609 (West
termination, and specific review 2001).
procedures
Montana Statute requiring "just cause" MONT. CODE ANN.
for termination § 33-37-104 (2005).
Nebraska Statute requiring sixty-day NEB. REV. STAT.
notice, but not reasons for § 44-7106 (2004).
termination
Nevada Statute protecting advocacy NEV. REV. STAT.
only ANN. § 616B.5285
(LexisNexis 2000).
New Hampshire No statute
New Jersey Comprehensive statute N.J. STAT. ANN.
requiring notice period, § 26:2S-8 (Supp.
physician right to request 2006).
reasons for termination, and
review procedures
New Mexico No statute
New York Comprehensive statute requir- N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
ing notice period, reasons for LAW § 4406-d
termination, review procedures, (Consol. 1997).
and protection for advocacy
North Carolina No statute
North Dakota Statute requiring notice, N.D. CENT. CODE
reasons for termination, § 26.1-36-41 (2002).
six-month period to correct
deficient conduct, and review
Ohio Statute providing for reasons OHIO REV. CODE
for termination, corrective ANN. § 1753.09
period, and two hearings after (West Supp. 2006).
which the decision "shall be
final"
Oklahoma Statute protecting patient com- OKLA. STAT. ANN.
munication and advocacy, tit. 36, § 6907 (West
providing for notice, and giving Supp. 2006).
physicians right to request
reasons for terminations
Oregon Statute protecting advocacy OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
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and requiring notice and hear- § 743.803 (West
ings prior to termination 2003).
Pennsylvania Statute requiring hearings for 40 PA. CONS. STAT.
quality of care or ethics inqui- ANN. § 6324 (West,
ries; requiring approval of state Westlaw through
department of health for Act 2005-58).
terminations
Rhode Island No statute
South Carolina No statute
South Dakota Statutes requiring notice period S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
and protecting patient § 58-17C-14 (2004).
communication and advocacy
Tennessee Statute protecting patient com- TENN. CODE ANN.
munication and advocacy; cre- § 56-32-230 (2000).
ating no private right of action
Texas Statutes requiring notice TEX. INS. CODE
period, reasons for termination, ANN. §§ 843.281,
and hearing with review panel, 843.306 (Vernon
which is not binding on MCO; 2005).
whistleblower and advocacy
protection
Utah Statute allowing termination UTAH CODE ANN.
with or without cause for the § 31A-22-617.1
first two years of the contract; (2005).
requiring notice period and rea-
sons in for-cause terminations;
providing for internal review
process and mediation thereaf-
ter if both parties agree
Vermont No statute
Virginia Statute requiring notice period VA. CODE ANN.
for termination with cause § 38.2-5805 (2002).
Washington No statute
West Virginia No statute
Wisconsin No statute
Wyoming No statute
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2. The New York Statute as a Model of a Comprehensive
Protective Statute
Whereas legislatures in a majority of jurisdictions have not
provided comprehensive statutory protection against wrongful
deselections, approximately one dozen states have done so. Section
4406-d of the New York Public Health Law is an instructive
example of a comprehensive deselection statute. Enacted in 1996,
section 4406-d contains provisions addressing all the areas dis-
cussed above.'29 It epitomizes comprehensive deselection legislation.
The New York law mandates that an MCO "shall not terminate a
contract with a [physician] unless the health care plan provides to
the health care professional a written explanation of the reasons for
the proposed contract termination and an opportunity for a review
or hearing."'3 The statute requires that physicians be given at least
thirty days in which to request a hearing before a review panel
appointed by the MCO."' The law specifies that the MCO review
panel shall be "appointed by the health care plan" and that "[a]t
least one person on such panel shall be a clinical peer in the same
discipline and the same or similar specialty as the health care
professional under review." '132 The panel may consist of more than
three persons, so long as one-third or more of the panel consists of
members of the same or similar specialty as the physician.'33 In
addition to choosing to reinstate or terminate the physician, the
review panel may also provisionally reinstate the physician subject
to conditions it finds appropriate.'
Regarding economic credentialing criteria, the MCO "shall
develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure that
health care professionals are regularly informed of information
maintained by the health care plan to evaluate" physician perfor-
129. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
130. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-d(2)(a) (Consol. 1997).
131. Id. § 4406-d(2)(b)(ii)-(iii).
132. Id. § 4406-d(2)(c). Nothing in the statute requires any of the panel members to be
unaffiliated with the MCO. Such an "in house" hearing panel is in line with what this Note
proposes infra Part V.
133. Id.
134. Id. § 4406-d(2)(d).
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mance."'3 MCOs are to consult with physicians in determining how
"professional profiling data" is collected and assessed.'36 Lastly, the
statute provides explicit protection for several types of patient
advocacy, including advocating on behalf of an insured, filing a
complaint against the MCO, and appealing a coverage decision by
the MCO."' The protections in section 4406-d do not apply in
deselections "involving imminent harm to patient care, a determina-
tion of fraud, or a final disciplinary action by a ... governmental
agency that impairs the health care professional's ability to prac-
tice."'3
The New York statute's protections are significant because they
are available to physicians both before and during a deselection
action. The physician facing deselection has access to both the
general criteria used by the MCO to evaluate physician performance
and also the reasons for which the insurer seeks to deselect him
-information clearly important for a physician to make an effective
defense against the proposed termination.'39 Physicians participate
in drafting credentialing criteria and deselection reviews, but not to
the exclusion of nonphysician MCO appointees. 40 The statute
provides balance between the rights of the MCO and the physician
during the deselection procedure. For instance, it provides explicit
reasons for which MCOs can deselect without review proceedings as
well as reasons for which MCOs can never deselect physicians.
Another reason that section 4406-d is a model example for
statutory protection for physicians facing deselection is that a New
York appellate court, in Foong v. Empire Blue Cross, found that the
statute creates an implied right of action for physicians to seek
enforcement of its terms.'4 ' That decision means that individual
135. Id. § 4406-d(4). For a discussion of the somewhat controversial practice of "economic
credentialing," see supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
136. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-d(4) (Consol. 1997).
137. Id. § 4406-d(5).
138. Id. § 4406-d(2)(a).
139. In Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., the defendant MCO repeatedly refused to give
the plaintiff physician any documentation regarding the reasons it sought to deselect him. 674
A.2d 962, 963-64 (N.H. 1996). Not surprisingly, with no access to the evidence, the physician
lost both internal MCO hearings. See id.
140. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4406-d(2)(c) and (4). For a discussion of the importance
of physician participation in deselection review procedures, see infra Part V.C.3.
141. 762 N.Y.S.2d 348, 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
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plaintiffs can bring a tort suit to enforce the provisions of the
statute, rather than, as in some states, being forced to rely on
governmental enforcement. In jurisdictions with statutory pro-
tections for physicians facing deselection, courts could provide
additional protection to those physicians by allowing them a private
cause of action to enforce these statutorily guaranteed rights.
Were legislatures in states that have not yet addressed the issue
of physician deselection to adopt legislation along the lines of the
New York statute, physicians practicing in the age of managed care
would be ensured a range of protections similar to those enjoyed by
workers in traditional employer-employee relationships.'42 It would
be unrealistic, however, to expect laws protecting physicians from
improper deselection to sweep across the country.143 Due to legisla-
tive inertia, courts in jurisdictions where the legislature has not yet
spoken must be ready to assess the merits of using the common law
to protect physicians, and their patients, from improper uses of
deselection.
C. Market Forces Will Continue To Encourage MCOs To Deselect
Physicians for Legitimate and Illegitimate Reasons
The second potential argument, that judicial and legislative
intervention in MCO deselection procedures is no longer necessary
given the intense public scrutiny of past MCO abuses," can be
tested by assessing the current dynamics of health insurance
markets, especially in jurisdictions where no statutory protections
have been enacted.
142. Indeed, the imposition of detailed procedural requirements into MCO-physician
contracts should ideally be handled by legislatures, not the courts. State legislatures have
enacted detailed legislative schemes regulating health insurers within their jurisdiction. The
task of creating a review process for physicians working within those regulatory schemes
logically ought best to be handled by the democratically elected legislatures that fashioned
those schemes in the first place. This Note argues that in jurisdictions where the legislature,
the institution best suited to handle abuses in MCO-physician contracting, has not acted, it
is incumbent upon state courts to do so.
143. See supra Figure I (demonstrating that a significant percentage of states have no
protections or have incomplete protections). Given this fact, it seems unlikely that the
remaining states will follow New York's policy.
144. See Fentiman, supra note 19, at 510-11 (discussing the abuses of early MCO practices
and the resulting "counterattack on managed care").
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Consolidation continues in the health insurance sector, boosting
insurers' market share. For example, on July 7, 2005, UnitedHealth
Group, Inc., the nation's second largest health insurer, announced
plans to purchase PacifiCare, a California insurer with nearly 3.2
million health plan members.145 In September 2005, WellPoint, Inc.,
the nation's largest health insurer, announced plans to merge with
New York's WellChoice, Inc., the last independent, publicly traded
Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan surviving in the United States.'46 After
the acquisition, WellPoint's national enrollment increased to over
thirty-three million members across fourteen states.147 WellPoint
became the nation's largest health insurer in 2004 through its
combination with Anthem.'4  One commentator, writing in early
October 2005, noted that "[s]ince January, at least a half-dozen
health plans have been snapped up by larger rivals, while seven of
the ten largest mergers in managed-care history have been struck
or completed in the past two years alone."1 49 The pace of mergers in
the health insurance sector can be accurately described as brisk.
Despite the significance of MCO consolidation occurring on a
national scale, the power of health insurers is best measured by
their market shares in individual geographic regions. 50 The danger
145. See, e.g., Joe Duarte, Commentary, Health-Care Merger May Have Broad Impact,
MARKETWATCH, July 7, 2005, available at LEXIS; David Phelps, Prescription for Growth."
Giant Health Insurers Such As UnitedHealth Are Buying up Smaller Ones Across the Country.
What Will It Mean for Consumers?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Oct. 9,2005, at 1D; Press
Release, Merger with PacifiCare Health Systems Inc., http://www.unitedhealthcare.com/
newsroomlnewsreleases/pacificaremerger.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
146. Laura B. Benko, Charting New HMO Territory: The Action Was in the Northeast Last
Week, as WellPoint Moved on WellChoice, and HIP-Group Health Merger Announced, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Oct. 3, 2005, at 6.
147. Id.; see also Daniel Lee, WellPoint Profit Soars for Quarter and 2005; '04 Merger's
Synergies Boost Income; Purchase of WellChoice Added 4.8 Million Members, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Jan. 26, 2006, at 3C; Victoria Colliver, WellPoint Triples Its Profit; Largest Health
Insurer Benefits from 2004 Merger, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2006, at C1.
148. Milt Freudenheim, California Backs Merger of 2 Giant Blue Cross Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2004, at Cl.
149. Benko, supra note 146.
150. Meg Green, Big, Better, Best? Even as Some Insurers Gain National Size Through
Mergers and Acquisitions, Competition Is Still a Local Battle, BEST'S REV., Mar. 1, 2004, at
82-83 ("The issue isn't how big a certain company is, but how large its local market share is,
said John Fitzgibbon, national industry director for managed care at accounting and tax firm
KPMG .... Tou can't make global statements about health care,' Fitzgibbon said. 'It's a
market-by-market business."').
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of insurers increasing their market strengths is apparent when
one considers that the greater market share the MCO has in a
geographic area, the greater the negotiating power that that insurer
will have over physicians there. As the Supreme Court of California
recognized in Potvin, the increasing consolidation of market share
by California health insurers gives them an increasing amount of
power both over physicians and patients. 161
As of the early part of this decade, nearly half of urban health
insurance markets faced near dominance by a single MCO:
According to a 2002 study by the [American Medical Associa-
tion], in 48% of highly concentrated HMO and PPO markets
with populations more than 1 million, a single payer had a
market share greater than 40%. In 24% of those markets, a
single payer had a market share in excess of 50%.152
The greater the market share controlled by an MCO, the more
unilateral control it will be able to exercise in physician
contracting.'53 It follows that, in the absence of legislative or judicial
directives, MCOs with such dominant market shares will not
voluntarily cede their ability to terminate physicians without
significant procedural protections.
This situation should legitimately concern physicians in jurisdic-
tions without statutory deselection protections. In particular, many
of the states with no statutory protection for physicians are also the
states most dominated by a single insurer. According to various
studies, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama maintains a market
share of approximately eighty percent of the Alabama market.5 4
151. Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Cal. 2000).
152. Green, supra note 150, at 83.
153. See, e.g., id. ("[I]n Pittsburgh, Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield owns 61% of the
HMO/PPO marketplace. 'Between Highmark and the government, it's pretty close to a single-
payer system. There is no such thing as tough negotiations; it's almost like a budgeting
process,' ... [said Dave Wilson, chief actuary of the Ventures Group, a consulting firm that
deals in health care matters].').
154. DEBORAH CHOLLET ET AL., MAPPING STATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS, 2001:
STRUCTURE AND CHANGE 13 (2003), available at http://www.statecoverage.net/pdf/mapping
2001.pdf (listing Blue Cross's share of the Alabama market at eighty-two percent); Sherri C.
Goodman, Blue Cross Names Pope New CEO, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Feb. 27, 2003, Business
("Blue Cross [Blue Shield of Alabama], the seventh largest Blue Cross plan in the country,
covers 2.3 million Alabamians or about 75 percent to 80 percent of the private health
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One study lists Alabama as second among state health insurance
markets in terms of the market share of the largest health insurer,
behind only North Dakota. 1 5 Alabama physicians have no
protections via statute or case law against deselections that violate
public policy."16
As in Alabama, the largest health insurer in Rhode Island is the
state Blue Cross Blue Shield plan. Current figures place the market
share held by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rhode Island at between
sixty-five and seventy percent."' Rhode Island is the fifth most
dominated state health insurance market, in terms of the largest
single insurer.'58 Like in Alabama, no statutory or case law
protections exist for Rhode Island physicians facing deselection.'5 9
On the West Coast, the health insurance market in Washington
State also illustrates troubling market conditions in a state where
physicians are without statutory or judicial protection against
arbitrary deselections. The Washington State market is not
dominated by a single insurer as completely as are Alabama's and
Rhode Island's: Premera, the state's largest health insurer, controls
only about thirty percent of the state market. 6 ° Yet, in the rural,
eastern portion of the state, Premera "easily holds about seventy
percent of the market." 6' Premera recently undertook a failed two-
year bid to convert from a nonprofit to a publicly traded for-profit
corporation, which the state insurance commission rejected "on
grounds that it could expose policyholders to excessive premium
increases, particularly in Premera's stronghold in Eastern Washing-
ton."'62 Even before the state denied Premera's bid to become a for-
insurance market.").
155. CHOLLET ETAL., supra note 154, at 13.
156. See supra Figure I.
157. CHOLLET ET AL., supra note 154, at 13 (65 percent market share); Lynn Arditi, Push
Is On by UnitedHealth for Customers, PROVIDENCE J., May 23, 2004, at A-1 (70 percent).
158. CHOLLET ETAL., supra note 154, at 13.
159. See supra Figure I.
160. See, e.g., CHOLLET ET AL., supra note 154, at 13 (listing the share of the largest
Washington insurer at 31 percent); Kyung M. Song, State Rejects Premera Plan: For-Profit
Request: Insurance Chief Rules After 2-year Battle To Shed Nonprofit Status, SEATLE TIMES,
July 16, 2004, at B1 (describing Premera as "the state's largest health insurer").
161. Candace Heckman, Premera Actions Worry Consumers: Insurer's Moves Could Limit
Care Options, Groups Claim, SEATLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 31, 2004, at B1.
162. Song, supra note 160.
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profit insurer, Premera's contractual relations with physicians had
been dangerously unstable in recent years. 16 3
The concerns of the Potvin court, particularly its concerns with
the power that a single MCO with dominant market share could
exert over a physician's ability to practice medicine in its market,
clearly apply to markets in Alabama, Rhode Island, and Washington
State as well. As this brief survey shows, it cannot be contended
that health insurance market conditions have become favorable
enough for physicians that deselection abuses are no longer a
legitimate concern. Because the legislatures in a significant number
of states have not acted to protect the interests of their physicians
and patients, courts should be prepared to intervene to protect the
public interest.
V. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR COURTS FACING PHYSICIAN
DESELECTION LITIGATION
A. Courts Should Use the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing To Respond to Deselection Abuses
In states where no statutory protections have been provided for
physicians,"6 courts should follow the Harper model and hold that,
under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a
physician facing deselection who believes that the action is based on
improper grounds is entitled to an administrative review. At this
review hearing, the physician should have the ability to challenge
the termination, whether for cause or without cause, that he
believes is being made for an improper reason.
163. See Heckman, supra note 161 (noting that the company had recently stopped
processing Medicare, Medicaid, and state-subsidized health plan claims, that it was under
investigation for defrauding the Medicare program, and that two hospital groups had decided
to terminate their contracts with Premera because the company was "unwilling to negotiate
for fair reimbursements").
164. Courts in states where adequate statutory protections have already been afforded to
physicians can reinforce such protections by holding that these statutes provide a private
right of action should MCOs not abide by the statutory requirements. Foong v. Empire Blue
Cross, 762 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003), provides a good example of a decision that does
exactly this. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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While not going so far as to create a per se rule to hold that all
without cause terminations violate public policy,'65 such a move
would eliminate the ability of insurers to mask improper
deselections as being without-cause terminations or terminations
for legitimate business reasons. Barring any use of without-cause
terminations in the physician deselection area might be problematic
in that termination at will is still an important concept in employ-
ment law generally.'" Maintaining this symmetry preserves the
analogy of the physician-MCO relationship to a traditional employ-
ment relationship-an analogy that on the whole suggests greater
procedural protections for physicians facing deselection1 7 To
preserve the use of this analogy for future recognition of rights vis-
A-vis insurer relations, physicians may not want to seek out rights
that further distinguish their position from that of workers in
employment relationships.
By using the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing, MCOs' good-
faith business decisions would be protected from judicial second-
guessing. There are, of course, valid reasons for which an MCO can
deselect a physician from its provider network. 6 ' Judicial interven-
tion in this area should strive to create as minimal an impact as
possible on MCOs' ability to respond to changing business condi-
tions and patient needs. The implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing allows courts to take such considerations into account on a
case-by-case basis.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, therefore,
should be the preferred method for courts to monitor physician
deselections in which physicians have not had a fair review process
at which to contest the termination. While attractive for its
guarantee that termination procedures "must be both substantively
rational and procedurally fair,"'69 the common law right to fair
procedure, relied on by the Potvin court, is unique to California and
165. Note that like the Harper court, the Potvin court also appears to have rejected such
a per se rule. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Part II.A.2.
168. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
169. Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1161 (Cal. 2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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thus cannot be easily imported into other jurisdictions. 7  Con-
versely, because the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is a fundamental principle of contract law,' v the Harper model can
be readily adopted by state courts. 72
The use of the well-established good faith and fair dealing
covenant would prevent the risk of judicial overreaching into the
legislative sphere while at the same time allowing courts to set
some basic principles that the good faith requirement imposes on
provider-MCO contracts.
7 3
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing opens the door
for courts to consider the enactments of legislative bodies and
physician groups such as the AMA as indicative of relevant public
policy standards. The positions of groups representing health
insurers ought to be consulted as well to ensure balance in making
determinations of the prevailing procedural standards employed in
our health care delivery system.
B. Courts Should Provide Procedural, Not Substantive,
Protections to Physicians Facing Deselection
A focus on ensuring procedural fairness, rather than on compiling
favored and disfavored bases for deselection, would prove a more
adaptive response to a continually evolving health insurance
environment.'74 Ensuring procedural protections would also provide
170. Roth, supra note 25, at 5.
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 205 (1981).
172. Given that Harper used the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to require
the procedural protections for physicians facing deselection, the functional distinction between
the right to fair procedure and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not
appear to be significant. See Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996).
173. The Harper court described these requirements as: "Good faith performance or
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and
consistency with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of
conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards of
decency, fairness or reasonableness." Id. at 965-66 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205, cmt. a. (1981)).
174. The radical changes in the American health care delivery system since the advent of
the managed care revolution illustrate the importance of not propounding substantive rules
of law that are too heavily tied into the context of our current health care delivery system. It
would be extremely difficult to hazard a guess at how Americans will pay for and receive their
health care twenty-five or fifty years from now, other than to assume that it will not be the
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an elegant and simple solution, again avoiding the potential for
judges to invade the legislative sphere. In Harper, the only feature
of good faith and fair dealing that the New Hampshire Supreme
Court identified was the requirement of an administrative review,
whether the termination was with cause or without cause. 175 This
Note suggests that in applying the doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing in provider-MCO contracts, courts could examine the broad
features of statutory protections in other jurisdictions, as represen-
tative of public policy, and extrapolate some basic features. The
most obvious of these are: a requirement of notice and a reasonable
period of time before the termination becomes effective; some ability
for physicians to examine the evidence against them; the ability for
physicians to receive administrative hearings if they believe the
contract was terminated for reasons that violate public policy; the
ability of physicians to have attorneys or other representatives
present for the review; the participation of unbiased doctors in the
administrative review if the termination is based on the physician's
medical decisions; and the ability of providers to seek redress in the
courts should these standards not be met.'76 Holding MCOs to these
broad requirements in contracting with providers should provide
physicians with procedural protection from deselection on illegiti-
mate grounds in the absence of legislative action.
same way they do today.
175. Harper, 674 A.2d at 966.
176. While this Note does not argue forcefully that each and every one of the components
described in this paragraph must be present for physician-MCO deselection disputes to
comport with the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, the absence of any one of these
provisions could lead to significant abuse that transforms "good faith and fair dealing" into
an illusion. See infra Part V.C.
Admittedly, none of these components could be classified as novel. Some have been
discussed previously in the literature. See, e.g., Brown & Jagla, supra note 1. That current
proposals have followed this direction makes sense, given the strong connection between the
contractual doctrine of good faith and fair dealing, traditional employment law, the shape and
direction of current statutory enactments, and indeed the holdings of cases like Harper and
Potuin themselves. Nonetheless, a detailed explanation of how and why these components are
needed is of great utility to physicians and their proponents, especially when coupled with the
demonstration that such protections are clearly needed across the country. See supra Parts
IV.B.1 and IV.C.
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C. Specific Procedural Components Courts Should Require Under
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
1. Notice and a Reasonable Period of Time Prior to Termination
Becoming Effective
Relevant statutes almost universally recognize the need for some
sort of period under which the physician can assess her situation
and decide whether to appeal the deselection.' Examples of such
notice periods range from forty-five days17 to sixty days'79 to ninety
days."s Under a highly restrictive reading of Harper, an MCO could
write into its provider contracts a provision that a physician may
request an administrative review after receiving notice of intent to
deselect, but then only give the physician ten days, for example, to
request a hearing. Such a situation would effectively undercut any
rights a physician would have to an administrative review if he
would need to determine whether to contest the deselection,
potentially locate an attorney or other representative, inspect any
evidence against him, and prepare a defense, all in a span of a
week-and-a-half. While not enunciated in Harper, the right to a
reasonable notice period in which a physician can challenge notice
of intent to deselect should be viewed as an integral part of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; courts will likely
view an administrative review structured so as to impair physicians'
rights to participate fully in that hearing as violating both good
faith and fair dealing.
2. Some Ability for the Physician To Inspect the Insurer's
Evidence
In Harper, one of the most noticeable barriers to the plaintiffs
ability to contest his deselection from Healthsource New Hampshire
was the MCO's refusal to provide Dr. Harper with any documenta-
tion or evidence upon which it based its determination that he had
177. See supra Part IV.B.1.
178. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 176B, § 7 (West Supp. 2006).
179. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3339(b) (1999).
180. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-8(b) (West 2006).
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not met its recredentialing criteria."' Clearly, "an appeals process
serves no purpose, if the law denies the appellant access to the
evidence necessary for discovering the true reason behind the
termination." '182 Again, although the court in Harper did not
explicitly require MCOs to provide physicians facing deselection
with some level of access to the insurer's evidence as a part of the
administrative review, 83 the facts of the case illustrate how any
chance at meaningful process will be undercut if the insurer can
withhold any and all evidence from the physician.
3. A Hearing at Which the Physician Can Be Represented and
Present a Defense
For an administrative review to truly satisfy the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, the hearing must give the physician
a fair opportunity to make her case against the deselection decision.
To best make certain that such hearings are not merely rubber-
stamp proceedings for the decisions of MCO management, the
physician should be afforded the presence of an attorney or other
representative who can lend experience and personal knowledge of
such proceedings to ensure a fair playing field. This is perhaps even
more important given that, by definition, such administrative
review proceedings will occur within the institutional framework of
the MCO rather than in a wholly separate tribunal."8 Further,
physicians are famously adverse to the legal and political spheres,
thus further evincing the need for physicians to have the ability to
be represented at administrative reviews.
If the decision involves questions of patient care, at least one
independent physician should take part in the administrative
review in order to ensure that the review panel is fully informed of
181. See Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 963 (N.H. 1996).
182. Liner, supra note 3, at 525.
183. In fact, Harper brought a separate statutory claim for damages due to Healthsource's
failure to share the records it used in making the determination to terminate him from its
network. The court dismissed this claim without prejudice as it was not raised at the trial
court level. Harper, 674 A.2d at 967-68.
184. The protection of having an experienced representative present should not remove the
obligation of insurers to establish a fair, if not wholly independent, panel of decision makers
to determine the merits of the physician cases. Such panels should include at least one
independent medical doctor if the deselection is based on the physician's medical judgment.
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relevant medical information and the standard of care surrounding
the treatment in question. The involvement of an independent
physician, as opposed to a review panel comprised entirely of
persons with insurance or management backgrounds, will help
protect the interest of patients in receiving the most appropriate
medical care. For instance, physician involvement in administrative
reviews would ensure that variables such as the general health of
the deselected physician's patient base are taken into account.
Further, physician involvement on review panels will also help
ensure that MCO officials do not overstep their bounds in "requir-
ing" physicians to perform particular lower cost treatments in
response to certain health conditions. The additional knowledge
base that would accompany physician involvement would help
panels recognize situations in which two or more medically appro-
priate treatments exist for a given medical condition and that in
such cases physicians should be able to pursue their best medical
judgment.
CONCLUSION
Though the apparent trend that commentators initially hoped for
following the decisions in Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire
and Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. has not yet material-
ized, there is still an important need for courts in other jurisdictions
to enact procedural protections for physicians facing deselection.
Inertia in state legislatures, combined with a tightening health
insurance market with significant merger and acquisition activity
among MCOs, continues to create a difficult situation for physicians
facing deselection. MCOs have the right to make legitimate business
decisions to maintain a provider panel that meets the current needs
of their insured. Yet, courts should ensure that physicians have the
procedural protection necessary to challenge deselection decisions
made without cause or for ostensibly financial reasons, if they
believe unstated reasons that violate public policy played a role.
Following the lead of Harper, courts can use the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing to provide protection to physicians
facing deselection while avoiding intrusion into medical or business
decisions. Such decisions will ensure that MCOs respect the
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important public interest entrusted to them in fostering the bond
between physician and patient.
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